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ABSTRACT 
 
PARK JEWAN, MIDDLE INITIAL., Masters : June : [2017:], Gulf Studies 
Title: Comparatative study of SMEs in Dubai and South Korea. 
 
Supervisor of Thesis: Dr. Steven Wright. 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have enjoyed large amounts of oil 
revenues for their development and prosperity over past fifty years or so. However, since the 
dramatic drop in oil prices in 2014, all the GCC countries are facing serious challenges in this 
regard. Dubai is one of the least dependent states in the UAE in terms of oil revenues and is 
the first state in the GCC to focus on SMEs. However, its economic activities are still, in 
many ways, related to oil activities and basic trading sectors. SMEs contribution to GDP in 
Dubai is also relatively lower than other European and Asian countries, and citizen’s 
participation in private sectors is also limited. In this regard, I argue that Dubai can use the 
development state model of South Korea to develop their SMEs and private sectors, as the 
Asian nation successfully used this theory to increase industrialization from an agricultural 
based economy from 1960 to 1990. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The majority of the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are currently 
looking for ways to diversify their economies. Since the GDP of the GCC countries is still 
mostly concentrated on hydrocarbon exports, these countries are seeking other ways to generate 
income for the sake of future generations. Moreover, current low oil prices are also affecting 
the economic decisions of the GCC countries, who are trying to move away from hydrocarbon 
exports. Thus, the GCC governments support local business entrepreneurs in order to generate 
revenue through other methods, as well as to create more jobs through private business sectors 
(Fisher, 2012). Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are one of the solutions for many 
countries, including those in the GCC, to diversify their economies (Zuazua et al., 2014; Fisher, 
2012). According to the World Bank, there are around 125 million micro, small, and medium 
enterprises (MSME) in the world (Kushnir et al., 2010). Also, SMEs’ contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of a number of countries is enormous. In the case of China, 60 percent 
of its GDP comes from SMEs, while SMEs account for 57 percent of Germany’s GDP, 55 
percent of Japan’s, and 47 percent of Malaysia’s (Ashoor, 2013). Therefore, in many countries, 
these SMEs are the backbone of economic growth and the driver of industrial development 
(Ashoor, 2013). 
Moreover, many of the young people in Gulf countries are jobless. According to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), GCC countries need to create 3.3 million new jobs by 
2020 in order to meet the demand of their growing populations (Zuazua et al., 2014). Currently, 
the public sector accounts for only 20 percent of the total jobs in the GCC; however, public 
sector jobs tend to pay more than private jobs, so most people prefer to work in the public 
sector. As stated by Zuazua et al., 
In the GCC between 2000 and 2010, 88 percent of new jobs were in the private sector, 
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but the population is unwilling to accept the lower wages. In other regions, such as the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the 
private sector competes with government by offering comparable pay (2014, pg,2). 
Nevertheless, other official data shows that there are more than 1 million SMEs in the 
Gulf States, with Saudi Arabia leading with +700,000 companies in the country (Fisher, 2012; 
Hertog, 2010). Also, an overwhelming 70 to 95 percent of the workforce in the GCC countries’ 
workforces are working in SMEs, and all of the GCC countries have launched programs to 
support SMEs within their countries (Zuazua et al., 2014). Currently, SMEs account for 95 
percent of the established firms in Dubai. Forty-two percent of Dubai’s population works in 
SMEs, and 40 percent of GDP is generated through SMEs in Dubai (“Dubai SME”, 2014). 
However, a considerable amount of data shows that SMEs in the Gulf States are 
underperforming despite the strong entrepreneurial traditions in the region’s culture, as well as 
the large size of the SME sector (Hertog, 2010). Based on this, it is relevant to look into these 
topics in greater depth. The literature below comprises detailed research into the topic.   
Literature Review 
According to the World Bank, there are 125 million formal micro, small, and medium 
enterprises (MSME) in the world (Kushnir et al., 2010). The authors define the term MSME 
according to the number of the employees (less than 250 people) in the company, but each 
country has a different definition when it comes to the numbers (Kushnir et al., 2010). Statistics 
show that East Asia and the Pacific have the most MEMEs, with a total of 39 million across 
the entire region. Meanwhile, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have the lowest 
number, with a total of 4.4 million MEMEs (Kushnir et al., 2010). These figures are important 
as they indicate the proportion of the small-sized companies in different regions. However, it 
was somewhat disappointing to find no separate set of figures for the GCC countries, instead 
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of being mixed together with that of the entire MENA region.  
Over the past decades, the GCC countries have spent a considerable amount of funding 
on infrastructural programs to diversify their economy and provide more jobs to their citizens. 
In 2014, the amount of funding rose to a record high of $ 171 billion (“Deloitte GCC Powers”, 
2016). However, at one point, many of the GCC countries realized that they were no longer 
able to provide jobs for an increasing number of their populations, including those for 
university graduates (Ramady, 2012). Therefore, many of these diversification programs began 
to target the private sector in order to create more jobs (Ramady, 2012). Currently, there are 
more than 1 million SMEs currently operating in the Gulf States (Fisher, 2012; Hertog, 2010).  
Many scholars believe that SMEs in the Gulf countries can be a major pillar of 
economic growth and a driver of job creation (Fisher, 2012; Hertog, 2010). Also, they promote 
economic stability as a supplement to large firms and broaden and diversify basic competition 
within the economy (Fisher, 2012). Based on these descriptions, SMEs can play a major role 
in achieving economic growth as well as creating jobs. Also, in privatization, competition is 
always a positive thing because it brings innovative ideas with increased quality of services 
and products.   
Currently, there is a huge amount of support from GCC governments towards new 
entrepreneurs. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the Ministry of Labor is leading a program to 
support 38 initiatives for SMEs. The King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology 
(KACST) program and the Saudi Credit and Savings Bank’s loan to SMEs are other examples 
(Zuazua et al., 2014). Currently, SMEs account for 93 percent of the total enterprises and 85 
percent of total employment in the Kingdom (“Qatar SME sector”, 2012; Ramady, 2012). This 
demonstrates the strength of government support to boost SMEs in Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, 
SMEs with less than 20 employees constitute 97 percent of total enterprises (“Qatar SME 
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sector”, 2012). The data shows that Kuwait had 33,000 SMEs in 2007, most of which were 
concentrated in the retail and service sectors (Hertog, 2010). In 2008, Oman had 48,950 SMEs, 
which are 90 percent of the total enterprises within the country. Nevertheless, current 
recruitment of local labor in SMEs sectors are very poor in Oman (“Qatar SME sector”, 2012; 
Badr, 2007). Moreover, mobilization of foreign capital and the market for industrial products 
are both weak in Oman (Badr, 2007). This shows that even though Oman is within the category 
of the GCC countries, it differs from its neighbors in some significant ways.  
On the other hand, Qatar announced the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV2030), in 
which the private and SME sector would play a very important role (“Qatar SME sector”, 2012). 
According to Trading Economics, Qatar has around 11,000 SMEs, yet the contribution of 
SMEs to Qatar’s GDP is minimal because the country is heavily reliant on hydrocarbon exports 
(Fernandez & Ali, 2015). However, the author believes that Qatar still has a chance to expand 
the idea of the SME economy.  
The future for SMEs in Qatar looks bright, and the Qatari government’s vision for  
2030 emphasizes the importance of SME contributions to the economy. The  
government’s strategy for economic development under the Qatar vision 2030 is to  
promote private sector involvement in economic diversification to reduce the  
dependency on the hydrocarbon industry (Fernandez & Ali, 2015, pg, 33).  
Moreover, there are many economic regulations which prevent SMEs from flourishing in the 
Gulf States; for example, there are limited opportunities given to SMEs to maximize profits 
and to implement effective risk management (Fisher, 2012).  
According to a World Bank report entitled the “Ease of doing Business Rankings”, the 
UAE was ranked 26th in the world in terms of ease of doing business, and the only GCC country 
ranked below 50 in this category, according to this certain criteria. This figure appears to show 
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that it may not be easy to do business in the Gulf region. Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar were ranked 
63rd, 66th, and 83rd, respectively, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were even further down 
(“Doing business”, 2017). According to the World Bank report, the rankings were determined 
based on four main sources of information: the laws and regulations of the country, the 
government, survey respondents, and the World Bank’s regional staff (Jaoui & Rashid, 2015). 
Therefore, these figures may be taken to be generally reliable. However, the variation in each 
country’s ranking seems to fluctuate from year to year. For instance, the ranking of Qatar is 
83rd in 2017 but was 68th in 2016, 50th in 2015, and 40th in 2013. Thus, such a degree of 
fluctuation could be too variable to be fully credible as a standard.  
In addition, Kaufmann and Shams (2015) argue that, in terms of business density, GCC 
states are experiencing a downward trend. The business density of UAE dropped from 2.18 in 
2004 to 1.38 in 2012, and other GCC countries, such as Qatar and Oman, have experienced 
similar declines.  
The remainder of the literature will be reviewed and used throughout the study in order 
to integrate the research and findings. 
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this study is to help Dubai, in which SMEs have flourished and been 
successful in succeeding in their diversification process by presenting South Korea as a 
successful SME model. In the past two years, oil prices have gone down enormously, which 
has caused most of the GCC countries and Dubai to cut expenses, as well as find a way to 
create income rather than oil revenues. Dubai and all other GCC countries are trying to find a 
way to diversify their economies by focusing on their private sector. Thus, improving the 
performance of SMEs in Dubai would also be a good model for other GCC states to follow. 
The role of SMEs in South Korea is indispensable, and many things could be learned by the 
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development state model, which is the process that South Korea used in the 1970s to become 
a modernized country. This study will carefully look into the domestic, and international factors 
of Dubai and South Korea, and find commonalities between the two countries.  
Research Question 
 All of the GCC countries have proposed some kind of government program to help the 
SMEs to grow (Zuazua et al., 2014). The government of the Emirate of Dubai has launched 
several programs to help their private sectors. Currently in Dubai, SMEs account for 95 percent 
of the total number of established firms. Therefore, the performance of SMEs in Dubai may 
provide a starting point for discussing the fundamental questions regarding how it can be more 
helpful to the economy of Dubai.   
Main Questions: 
- What is the role of SMEs and how do they contribute to the economic development of 
Dubai? 
- What lessons could Dubai learn from the development state model of South Korea?  
Sub Questions: 
What is developmental state theory? How does it fit into the case of Dubai? Using the 
developmental state theory, how can we improve the situation in Dubai? What other theory 
could be applied in the case of Dubai? What are challenges Dubai faces regarding achieving 
better performance in the private sector? 
Theoretical Framework 
Despite abundant oil revenues since the oil boom in 1970s, GCC countries have had very 
unimpressive economic performance (Ross, 2001). This is largely due to the stagnation of non-
oil sectors, such as manufacturing and other private sectors (Mazaheri, 2016; Ross, 2001). 
However, many of these private sectors were not supported properly by the government 
 7 
 
institutions, even though they employed a large percentage of the workforce. Moreover, some 
researchers claim that governments intentionally impose barriers to medium-sized firms, a 
phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as the “missing middle”. A growing middle class, 
which consists of non-elite entrepreneurs and owners of SMEs, tends to ask for democratization 
(Nasr, 2009). For instance, in Europe, alliances of workers and capitalists were eager to unseat 
the elites who had their own political interests in obstructing democracy (Mazaheri, 2016). 
Therefore, there is always the possibility that middle class non-elites and SME owners may ask 
for democracy, which may have discouraged GCC governments from following this path in the 
past (Mazaheri, 2016). Rostow’s stages of growth, which later came to be known as 
modernization theory, also supports this notion.  
According to Rostow, all societies have the potential to become advanced 
industrialized societies (Rostow, 1990). Rostow believes that all societies follow the same 
evolutionary path of development, which is divided into five stages. The first stage is the 
traditional society, which can be viewed as a subsistence economy (Sanderson, 2013). This 
means the society is lesser developed, a high percentage of the workforce is agricultural, and a 
high percentage of national wealth is focused on non-productive activities, such as the military 
and religion (Loi, 2015). Also, people build their lives based on their families, local 
communities, and religions, which makes their lives very similar to those of their ancestors.  
Such societies generally have very limited wealth, and what little trade there is takes 
the form of barter, which is a form of a payment (Shujahat, 2012). We can say that this first 
stage was also evident back in the early history of GCC countries, when countries such as 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE were engaged in pearl diving, which provided most of their income. 
The second stage is called the preconditions for takeoff. Usually, leaders or kings motivate 
people to start innovative economic activities such as building banks and coining money. Then, 
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the populations are able to start providing goods that are not only for their consumption, but 
also to sell. As a result, the government also starts to invest in infrastructure, such as public 
transportation and water sewage (Loi, 2015). These projects ultimately help the country to 
attain large productivity.  
In the case of the GCC countries, I would argue that the first stage has been achieved, 
while the second stage has yet to be realized. Instead, oil came into the scene, resulting large 
amounts of revenue coming into the region from outside. The next stage is called the take off. 
Rapid economic development occurs at this stage, and is focused on limited products such as 
textiles and food products. Increasing industrialization and further growth in savings and 
investment occurs at this stage (Shujahat, 2012). Moreover, increased individualism allows 
people to fulfill desires for material goods, and modernization occurs in the core areas of the 
country (Loi, 2015). There are also the fourth and the fifth stages, which are known as the drive 
to maturity and high mass consumption, respectively. However, the case of the Gulf countries 
does not seem to fit into these stages, because many of them have achieved modernization 
without the requisite stages of growth. Their situation does not match with Rostow’s theory. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, modernization theory is not reflected in any of the Gulf States 
because, according to the theory, once there is a large middle class in the society, it will ask for 
political rights and democracy, but paradoxically this is not happening in any of the Gulf states 
(Gray, 2011).  
The theory that many scholars who study the region apply to the GCC states is the 
“rentier state” theory. Rentier state theory describes a situation in which a country receives a 
large amount of revenue from a “rent” of certain resources, such as oil in the Gulf countries. In 
this situation, governments are unlikely to tax their own citizens, and provide many benefits to 
their citizens. In turn, this can lead to promoting authoritarianism and political stability 
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(Mazaheri, 2016). However, from an economic perspective, “it is argued that rentier states are 
inefficient with a weak administrative capacity, a corrupt civil service, and an absence of the 
rule of law” (Mazaheri, 2016, pg, 5). Further, a rentier state cannot fully account for certain 
aspects of the business environment in the Gulf states. According to Mazaheri (2016), “The 
rentier state argument also predicts that oil wealth will lead to greater political stability, which 
may lead us to expect a less restrictive business environment” (pg, 6). However, in reality, this 
is not so. GCC states have much more restrictive economic regulations. It also reflects the 
rentier mentality, meaning that when people live under a bubble, they are not motivated and do 
not have a thriving private sector as a consequence. 
Nevertheless, in both the Gulf region and the European Union (EU), small and medium 
enterprises are the main drivers for economic diversification and job creation (Hertog, 2010; 
Fisher, 2012). Also, Hertog (2010) believes that without a flourishing SME sector, it will be 
difficult for Gulf countries to achieve economic diversification and address their 
unemployment issues. This is similar to the situation in many parts of the world; however, 
Hertog (2010) believes that SMEs in the Gulf States are underperforming, considering the 
tradition of entrepreneurship, as well as the large size of the SME sector. The reason that Dubai 
was chosen for this study is that Dubai is one of the first countries in the GCC states that has 
focused on diversifying its economy by using the private sector as a tool.  
In this regard, the South Korean development model could be implemented in the cases 
of the Gulf states. The development state theory was first formulated in the late industrialization 
period by Friedrich List, who emphasized the state’s leading role in development policy (Jaejin, 
2005). This theory was then further developed by Johnson in 1982 in his research for his article 
“Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese miracle” (Johnson, 
1999). This is similar to the pre-modern mercantilist idea that the state should play a central 
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role in economic development (Kasahara, 2013). Johnson used this theory to explain the rapid 
economic development in East Asian countries including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
(Johnson, 1999). Johnson emphasized that this theory was different from the American-style 
capitalist theory, as well as the Soviet style of communism.  
Research Design 
According to Creswell (2013), there are four philosophical world views, and among 
them, the pragmatic world view is used in my research. Pragmatism as an epistemology, is a 
world view that occurs “out of actions, situations, and consequences rather than antecedent 
conditions” (Creswell, 2013, pg, 40). Therefore, the essay will look at the benefits of 
developmental state theory, which was used in the case of the East Asian countries, especially 
South Korea. Further, it will apply the pragmatic world view to the case of Dubai, where 
progress and economic improvement is expected. Also, a mixed methods design comprising 
both qualitative and quantitative data will be used in this investigation in the form of a 
secondary data analysis. The quantitative analysis was used to organize the groundwork for my 
research. Also, it was employed to the existing secondary data acquired from the World Bank 
and several other government institutions, such as the Department of Economic Development 
in Dubai and the Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development on SMEs. In addition, for the mixed 
methods design, exploratory sequential mixed methods will be implemented, which “involve a 
two-phase project in which the researcher collects quantitative data in the first phase, analyzes 
the results, and then uses the results to plan (or build onto) the second qualitative phase” 
(Creswell, 2013, pg, 275). Therefore, the quantitative data will first be reviewed to define the 
importance of SMEs in Dubai, then, on the basis of this result, the data would then be analyzed 
using qualitative methods. Overall, the qualitative data will help us to explain the details of the 
initial quantitative results (Creswell, 2013). However, I did not focus on explaining or 
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analyzing the data in detail. Instead, I tried to use these collected data from various institutions 
to understand the trends to be addressed in the qualitative analysis and to provide additional 
arguments.  
For the quantitative methods, the data will be collected and analyzed. These data 
mostly come from the international organizations and official websites. However, the most 
frequently used quantitative methods of closed-ended surveys are not conducted in this 
research. Also, it would have been better if we could obtain information from survey SME 
owners in Dubai and South Korea; however, due to the logistical limitations, this was not 
possible at this stage. Also, obstacles that may prevent the SME sector in Dubai from having 
better economic performance will be reviewed using quantitative methods. Most of the data 
were collected through World Bank official websites. Thus, this essay would like to address 
the role of SMEs in Dubai and how they contribute to its economic development. In addition, 
case studies of South Korean SMEs will be examined to see what lessons they can impart to 
SMEs in Dubai. Developmental state theory, which was the basis of the development of South 
Korea, will be analyzed carefully in order to find how it can be most effectively applied to the 
case of Dubai. Thus, this essay began by presenting the theoretical framework used in this 
research. The second part then explicates the various development state models and theories 
applied to different countries in East Asia. Next, the third part analyzes the role of SMEs in 
Dubai and how they contribute to the development of the country. This part also examines the 
challenges that prevent Dubai-based SMEs to grow further. Then, the cases of the “Chaebol” 
(Big firms such as Samsung and Hyundai) in South Korea will be addressed, using the 
developmental state theory. The final part includes a discussion of the ways to implement 
development state theory in Dubai, in addition to some concluding remarks. 
. 
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Chapter 2: Developmental State 
The cases of South Korea and Japan could provide the basis of instructive comparisons. 
Before doing so, however, we will look at the concept of the developmental state theory, which 
East Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan have used to develop their countries from 
the 1920s. Developmental state theory refers to state-led macroeconomic planning where the 
state takes increased control over the economy of the country (Kasahara, 2013). This theory 
was first properly conceptualized by Johnson, while conducting research for his article “MITI 
and the Japanese Miracle” in 1982 (Johnson, 1999). The developmental state theory could be 
defined as strong state intervention, together with considerable regulation and planning. The 
development state theory has three stages: commodity exports, import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI), and export-led growth (Sanford, 2012). This means that the 
development state theory focuses on exporting goods, encouraging domestic production rather 
than foreign imports, and an export-oriented economy. Later on, this theory was also 
implemented in other East Asian countries like Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, countries 
sometimes referred to as “late industrializers” (Kasahara, 2013). The development state 
emphasizes the role of the state in helping the structural transition of the country to move from 
a primitive/agriculture to a modern/manufacturing society (Kasahara, 2013). According to 
Johnson (1982) in his research on “MITI and the Japanese Miracle”, all states intervene in 
domestic economic issues, but this intervention differs. As Johnson states, 
 The issue is not one of state intervention in the economy. All states intervene in their  
economies for various reasons… The United States is a good example of a state in  
which the regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan is a good example of a  
state in which the developmental orientation predominates. A regulatory, or market- 
rational state, concerns itself with the forms and procedures- the rules, if you will- of  
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economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive matters (pg, 17,  
19).  
Um and Hwang (2014) argue that the Asian model of Development State succeeded due to two 
main reasons: the “Primary role of free trade and export-oriented industrialization in the 
economic growth of the region, and thus, the superiority of free market principles without 
price-distorting state-intervention” (pg, 215). Many scholars believe that the manufacturing 
sector has a role in boosting the growth of the country due to its high level of productivity. 
Johnson explained the state bureaucracy’s active and strategic role in Japanese economic 
development. These bureaucratic activities go back to the 1920s, when Japan mobilized its 
industrial resources for the purpose of the war (Um & Hwang, 2014). The developmental state 
is also identified by the actual achievement of the economy, since it emphasizes the strong 
improvement on living standards of the society and the state’s active interventionist role in the 
economy (Kasahara, 2013).  
After Johnson’s Japanese work was published, several additional works followed that 
focused on East Asian cases, particularly those regarding South Korea and Taiwan (Um & 
Hwang, 2014). These development states in East Asia did not follow a single path, but rather 
used two institutional attributes known as competent bureaucracy and embedded autonomy 
(Kasahara, 2013). Competent bureaucracy means the planned process of economic 
development, as in the Japanese cases. In this process, the best human resources are needed, 
and are used to direct the course of the country’s development (Kasahara, 2013). This process 
has been successful in the case of Japan, as well as in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. 
Embedded autonomy refers to the ideal relationship between the developmental state and the 
local business sector. According to Johnson, a successful developmental state should be 
adequately embedded in the society (Kasahara, 2013).  
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The Japanese case is very interesting to examine, which Johnson terms the “Japanese 
miracle”. According to Johnson’s (1982) work on “MITI and Japanese Miracle”, for more than 
50 years, Japan’s first priority was to maintain consistent economic development. Johnson 
(1982) argues that for any state who wants to achieve economically, they must adapt same 
priorities as Japan. As he states, “It must first of all be a development state- and only then 
regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kind of functional state a 
society may wish to adopt” (pg, 306).  
However, the central problem of a state-led system is about the relationship between 
state bureaucracy and privately-owned businesses (Johnson, 1982). Due to this reason, over 
the past 50 years, Japan has implemented three different solutions, which are self-control, state 
control, and cooperation. Also, during Johnson’s study, he attempted to find out the essential 
features of the Japanese developmental state (Johnson, 1982). Johnson found that first, the 
government needed to employ a small, inexpensive, and elite state bureaucracy, which thus 
requires the most qualified and competent people to learn the system (later known as competent 
bureaucracy, as explained previously). Second, this government must find out the industry 
which could be most rapidly developed (industrial rationalization policy), and third, to 
supervise the competition of these people to assure effectiveness and economic health (Johnson, 
1982). 
In addition, when we look at the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) from the first-
tier, we usually refer to South Korea, the Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Even though all the NIEs have used the development state theory, the result was different in 
each of the cases. South Korea used the interventionist policy in 1960s and 1970s when 
business leaders relied heavily on the close consultation of the state actors (Kasahara, 2013). 
In contrast, Taiwan used a distant and fragmented policy, mainly because of their tense relations 
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with many of the bureaucrats. Moreover, most of their military personnel were appointed by 
the mainland. Therefore, many of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) existed together with 
smaller firms, thus giving room for development (Kasahara, 2013). However, the 
developmental state model also had a fault, much like the Indian cases (Bolesta, 2007). The 
main reason for the failure of Indian cases was that the economy was not liberalized enough, 
and state policy was too interventionist in nature (Bolesta, 2007). An important point here is 
that a development state needs interventionism, but it has to balance out. In doing this, Bolesta 
(2007) states that “wise, developmentally-focused interventionism” is needed. Unlike the 
liberal ideology of invisible hands, state interventionism has to be managed wisely in order to 
succeed (Bolesta, 2007). Moreover, even countries like the United States, which made good 
use of the minimal state-used protectionism policy during the industrialization period (Jaejin 
2005). Also, an enormous amount of investment by the Department of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Defense towards research and development (R&D) created a leading role for the 
United States in biotechnology, aviation, aerospace, and IT industries (Jaejin, 2005). This 
example shows that even countries like the USA needed to have state intervention in certain 
position of the policies. Chang (1999) argues about this point in his essay that, the state always 
takes a central role on development; firstly, because there are so many different types of 
economic values, and industry acceleration always requires rearrangement. The only institution 
able to handle this rearrangement is a government. Without the intervention of the government, 
transaction cost increases tremendously, which thus leads to market failure, and eventually, the 
inability to reorganize industry in time (Chang, 1999).  
Petro Developmental State in Africa 
There is a recent developmental state model known as the petro-developmental state 
in African oil-producing countries. Thus, it would be beneficial to examine this model in 
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greater detail. According to Ovadia (2016), Africa was part of a global capitalist system; 
however, the continent did not benefit much from this capitalist development. Instead, Africa 
had to suffer due to the role of international financial institutions, such as International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). Therefore, seven of 
oil-exporting countries in Africa, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, and Congo 
decided to come up with new model of a petro-development state which can benefit 
themselves (Ovadia, 2016).   
Table 1. Production of Crude Oil Including Lease Condensate (“US Energy”, 2013) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Angola 1,946 1,867 1,899 1,746 1,777 1,831 
Cameroon 81 77 65 62 63 63 
Chad 127 120 123 115 105 98 
Equatorial 
Guinea 337 322 298 278 289 270 
Gabon 248 242 246 245 242 243 
Ghana 6 6 7 77 78 98 
Nigeria 2,165 2,208 2,455 2,550 2,520 2,367 
Republic of 
Congo 233 268 305 290 280 265 
 
Table 1, shows the data of these seven countries. According to the data, Angola, Nigeria, and 
Guinea managed to produce 1.8 million, 2.3 million, 0.27 million barrels of oil daily, 
respectively. Therefore, the GDP growth of these three countries was more than 5 percent 
during 2001 to 2010 (Ovadia, 2016). In fact, their GDP growth was the highest in the world.  
 In January 2011, The Economist published data showing that, over the last decade,  
Angola had the world’s highest GDP growth rate, while Nigeria had the fourth highest  
(Ovadia, 2016, pg, 3).  
The author also highlights the previous work of Chalmers Johnson on the development state, 
thereby raising important questions such as “How do you create developmental state in sub-
Saharan Africa?” Like the cases in Latin America, African countries also tried hard to kickstart 
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the industrialization within their country (Ovadia, 2016). Development state theory comes in 
after the involvement of the IMF and the World Bank with their structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) which were largely unsuccessful (Meyns & Musamba, 2010).  
 The SAP-inspired decades in Africa are today frequently referred to as the “lost  
decades”, and the persistence of the poverty crisis has led international donors to  
refocus their aid programmes on debt relief-funded poverty reduction strategies  
(Meyns & Musamba, 2010, pg, 7). 
As a result, many African countries looked for different types of development models , and at 
the end of 1990s, the current development state was implemented (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). 
The African countries focused on the success of the Japanese case, where an interventionist 
policy was implemented by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (Ovadia, 
2016). These policies were studied and implemented in the current petro-developmental state 
in Africa. I am not trying to give an in-depth analysis of the African development state model; 
rather, I only intend to show that the development state is not an old theory, as it was used in 
East Asian countries in the 20th century. Also, I wanted raise the issue that the current low oil 
price could be beneficial to the Gulf countries if they manage to diversify their economy as 
they have planned and emphasized; however, no one can assure that the oil price could go back 
to $100 or $ 150 a barrel, which would be the best scenario for these GCC countries. 
Nevertheless, these developments, would remain within the Gulf countries and could 
eventually lead to another successful form of the development state model.  
In conclusion, East Asian countries used developmental state theory to develop their 
country from agricultural/primitive to a manufacturing/modern industries. Although there were 
slight differences on implementing the theory, developmental state was successful in most of 
newly industrialized countries like South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. Also, petro 
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developmental state in Africa was important to review as it is one of the most recent form of 
developmental state model. We will first look at the current situations in Dubai in Chapter 3 
then South Korea’s development model will be explained in depth in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: Dubai 
Oil was first found in Dubai in 1966, with exports beginning in 1969. This production 
was increased to 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1973, which helped the local economy to 
grow rapidly (Al Faris & Soto, 2016). Unlike other GCC states, which predominantly used the 
funds to buy generous amounts of land and to give compensation to their citizens, the Dubai 
government chose to invest in the future. Jebel Ali port started to construction in 1972, as well 
as the construction of a dry dock in 1979 (Al Faris & Soto, 2016). Also, the Dubai government 
announced the free trade zone in 1985, which is known as the Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone 
(JAFZA) and started Emirates Airlines in same year (Al Faris & Soto, 2016). However, Dubai 
had to endure a rough period in the 1980s due to the low oil prices and the war between Iraq-
Iran, in which some of the commercial ships were attacked by the forces. However, by the 
1990s and the first half of the 2000s, Dubai concentrated on tourism, rebranding the country as 
‘Hub Dubai & e-Dubai’, which attracted a huge amount of capital within the city (Al Faris & 
Soto, 2016). Moreover, Dubai also managed to diversify their economy through property 
development, the private sector, and overseas investment (“Dubai SME”, 2014; Al Faris & 
Soto, 2016).  
 However, the global finance crisis in 2008 disclosed the weak structural features of 
Dubai’s economy. The crisis showed that Dubai needed to restructure its system to have 
sustainable development. According to Al Sadik and Elbadawi (2012),  
 Though the economy of Dubai is relatively diversified and its dependence on the  
hydrocarbon sector as a direct contributor to GDP is limited, as it did not exceed 2 
percent in 2008, it has, nevertheless, been subject to the oil cycle, among other factors, 
due to its being part of the oil-dominated economy of the UAE (pg, 2). 
These statements explain why Dubai has such a high volatility GDP growth. Until 2008, Dubai 
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used the development model, which was focused on the massive accumulation of factors of 
production, which relied on capital and unskilled migrant labor (Al Sadik & Elbadawi, 
2012). This model helped Dubai’s economy to grow rapidly and develop a high quality of 
infrastructures; however, it also allowed total factor productivity growth (TFP) to remain the 
same, or even move into negative figures (Al Sadik & Elbadawi, 2012). Unlike capital or labor 
inputs, TFP is hard to measure because it represents human capital, which includes technology 
and the knowledge of workers (Isaksson, 2007). Also, most of the labor forces in Dubai are 
foreigners, and it is difficult to have sustainable development if the citizens do not take it 
sincerely. Furthermore, according to Isaksson (2007), TFP grants society with an opportunity 
to elevate the welfare of the people. Therefore, it is compulsory for Dubai to have positive 
growth rates of TFP to maintain high growth in GDP in the long run. 
SMEs in Dubai & GCC countries 
Currently, ninety-five percent of the established firms in Dubai are SMEs and forty 
two percent of the total populations are working in the SME sector, which is a huge number. 
Dubai was one of the first countries in the Gulf state to focus on the SMEs in order to diversify 
their economy (“Dubai SME”, 2014). Moreover, Dubai’s GDP grew more than 10 percent 
during 2000 to 2012. During this time, the Dubai government reflected upon many different 
types of policies to diversify their economy, with great improvement being made. SMEs were 
one of main contributors to success, and 37 percent of SMEs in Dubai are currently exporting 
or are capable of exporting goods (“SME Financing”, 2013). It also increased job opportunities, 
not only for the locals but also to find jobs for foreign workers (“Dubai SME”, 2014).  
Moreover, Dubai’s oil dependency on GDP has decreased from 45 percent in the 1980s 
to less than 5 percent in 2010, which is a remarkable result (Al Faris & Soto, 2016). Further, 
many people believe that Dubai’s SME sector will bring innovation and contribute to the 
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science and technology sectors (“SME Financing”, 2013).  
 
Figure 1. Sector-wise Split of SMEs in Dubai (“Dubai SMEs”, 2014) 
Figure 1 shows the current sector-wise split of SMEs in Dubai, of which the majority of the 
businesses are concentrated in trading with 57 percent, followed by services and manufacturing 
with 35 percent and 8 percent, respectively. This figure shows the concentration on the trading 
sector and need to shift these numbers toward the service and manufacturing sector, which is 
Dubai’s main target. 
  
 
Figure 2. Gross Value add by Size of firms & Employment rate by Size of firms (“Dubai SMEs”, 2014) 
Figure 2 shows that SMEs account for 40 percent of Dubai’s GDP and 42 percent of 
the total employment in Dubai (Zuazua et al., 2014; “Dubai SME”, 2014). This number is 
relatively lower than other Asian countries such as China and Singapore; in China, 60 percent 
of GDP is produced by SMEs, and in Singapore, more than 50 percent of GDP is produced 
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through SMEs (Gill, 2016; Goran, 2013). Also, 95 percent of established firms in Dubai are 
SMEs, which is a huge number. Therefore, the Dubai government has tried to encourage more 
people to have entrepreneurial minds by offering training, business planning, and support with 
finances, which would help nationals to have their own enterprises in the near future. 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Establishment for SME development was established in 2002 to help 
SMEs in Dubai, as well as those in the UAE. (“Entrepreneurship in Dubai”, 2017). This 
establishment offers funding, entrepreneur support, and advice to SMEs in the UAE.  
 These organizations seek to motivate young Arab leaders to become integral parts of  
the region’s economy. Government support for young Emirati entrepreneurs is  
exceptionally generous and there are several grants available for those with a strong  
business plan (“Entrepreneurship in Dubai”, 2017). 
Moreover, the Mohammed Bin Rashid Award for Young Business Leaders was created to raise 
awareness of new entrepreneurs who are young and have great ideas. The establishment has a 
total of AED 700 million of funding with Islamic banking principles, and has the capability to 
support SMEs who are in need (“Entrepreneurship in Dubai”, 2017). Also, the Dubai Business 
Women’s Council was created in 2002 to encourage women entrepreneurs to start businesses 
with limited capital. This allowed other international banks like JP Morgan to form a foundation 
called “the Cherie Blair Foundation for Women” in UAE to support 60 women entrepreneurs 
(“Promoting Women”, 2017). These efforts seem to be very important for UAE and Dubai to 
grow their SME sectors, which would also aim to develop innovative skills. Moreover, the 
UAE is now hosting the “SME awards” every year, and gives prices and awards to the 
enterprises that perform well each year (“SME Awards” 2017). Any company can apply for the 
awards, as long as they are based in the UAE, have less than 250 employees, and a turnover of 
less than 250 million Dhs (“SME Awards” 2017). These kinds of government efforts to promote 
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the private sector seem to be successful; however, although there is a considerable growth in 
the SME sector, significant challenges remain to be solved in order to have better performance 
in private sector. 
Challenges 
First of all, localization and low productivity is a serious problem. Each country has a 
different name for this localization. In the UAE, Qatar, and Oman, it is known as Emiratization, 
Omanization, and Qatarization, respectively. In Arabic, it is called “Nitaqat”. Localization 
basically means the employment of local citizens prior to other nationalities in the private and 
public sectors (Salama, 2009). This also includes the replacement of the other nationalities in 
place of their local citizens. Overall, this phenomenon could be due to the youth unemployment 
in GCC countries. 
 
Figure 3. Youth unemployment rate in GCC countries (ages 15-25) (“World Development Indicator”, 2016). 
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics in 2012, Figure 3 explains youth 
unemployment in GCC countries and this number seems very problematic (“World 
Development Indicators”, 2016). In Saudi Arabia, 27.8 percent of the populations were 
unemployed, whereas in Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE, it is 27.5, 20.6, and 11 percent, 
respectively. Currently, Qatar is the only country that is not facing theses youth unemployment. 
Therefore, each of the GCC countries has tried to solve the problems by hiring or replacing 
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their local citizens in certain sectors, but it seems that this task is also not an easy duty. For 
instance, in Saudi Arabia, the Saudization process is not working as they planned. According 
to the Ministry of Labor of Saudi Arabia, “Saudi Arabia’s “Saudization" policy, which seeks to 
prioritize the hiring of Saudi nationals over expatriates, has so far been a failure” (Riflan, 2011). 
The Saudization policy was found to push private companies to hire a certain number of Saudi 
citizens based on the size of their companies; however, this policy did not go so well. Therefore, 
Saudi Arabia launched a new policy called “Guided localization” which focuses on certain 
sectors that are profitable, for instance, telecommunication. Now, 100 percent of the 
telecommunication sector should be operated by Saudi nationals (Alabdan, 2016). Alabdan 
(2016) states that 30-40 percent of mobile shops are closed because they cannot hire Saudi 
nationals, which is a core requirement, and in addition, shop owners are unsure regarding 
reopening them, as it is hard to understand whether hiring a national could be profitable or not. 
In the case of Qatar, more than 500 Filipino nurses have lost their jobs due to this process 
(Kovessy, 2016). In the UAE, the Emiratization policy should have played a very important 
role for the private sector as well as the public sector. According to National Vision 2021 news,  
The UAE has given great importance to the subject of Emiratization, having  
announced that 2013 will be the year of Emiratization, along with launching the  
“Absher” initiative…Absher is based on four main themes, namely the creation of job 
opportunities for nationals, vocational guidance and counseling, training and  
development, and the encouragement of nationals to work in the private  
sector (“Emiratization Efforts”, 2013).   
However, in reality, this program did not encourage citizens to work in the private sector rather 
than public sector. In a recent report from the Federal National Council (NFC) of UAE, there 
are 3.8 million jobs in the private sector and only 20,000 to 30,000 Emiratis are working in the 
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private sector (Aleter, 2016). NFC believes that among 3.8 million private jobs, at least 800,000 
jobs could be taken by the citizens. However, the results are really disappointing compared to 
the amount of effort spent by the government authorities.   
I strongly believe that, with the localization policy, there are limitations for the private 
sector to grow. Also, to have a thriving private sector as well as to have localization policy, I 
believe it is not possible to achieve both at once. This is because the public sector seems to 
look much more attractive than the private sector. “Emiratis, by and large, still perceive the 
public sector to be a more attractive employer, for reasons ranging from superior employment 
benefits to a lack of awareness of private sector opportunities” (Aleter, 2016). Thus, from an 
Emirati perspective, it makes sense to not want to take on additional stress, or work much more, 
when one can make the same amount of money by merely attending a job. This is a serious 
issue.  
Moreover, this localization policy leads to low productivity. Citizens who know the 
benefits of the public sector would not risk working in private sectors that have their fair share 
of risks and uncertainties (Aleter, 2016). However, between 2000 to 2010, 88 percent of new 
jobs are coming from the private sector in the GCC countries (Zuazua et al., 2014). This is 
ironic, but when the jobs are secured from the public sector in the name of localization, citizens 
are less motivated to contribute to their institutions or to their semi-government companies. 
When we look at the productivity per person (PPP) basis, Dubai’s SME sector has a low 
productivity of AED 112,253 per unit (“Dubai SME”, 2014). This is much lower than other 
trading and services oriented countries, such as Singapore and South Korea, where their 
productivity per unit is AED 391,816 and AED 214,787, respectively (“Dubai SME”, 2014). 
This means that if we compare one person in Singapore and another in Dubai, the person in 
Singapore produces 3.5 times more than the person working in the same sector in Dubai. The 
 26 
 
main reasons for low productivity in Dubai are as follows:  
- Low focus of businesses on improvements / reengineering of business processes to  
improve efficiency.  
- Limited focus of businesses on training, development, and up-skilling of employees 
due to a transient nature of the workforce.  
- Limited adoption by businesses of advanced enterprise level ICT systems (such as ERP, 
CRM solutions) (“Dubai SME”, 2014, pg, 24). 
The data above was provided by the government of Dubai, but they did not mention anything 
about the structural problem, which starts with localization process. Moreover, Figure 4 shows 
the productivity growth of the UAE, which has been decreasing since the early 1990s. The 
UAE seems to have the lowest productivity compared to the other three GCC countries.  
 
Figure 4. Comparative labour productivity growth in four GCC states (1980–2010) (Hertog, 2013). 
Figure 4 shows that Saudi Arabia was slightly underperforming after the 1990s, whereas 
Kuwait and Oman both have a higher productivity growth as compared to the other GCC 
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countries. Also, interestingly in the UAE, the growth rate fell to -19.52 in 2008, when the 
country was facing a direct economic crisis. (“Labor Productivity Growth”, 2017). Furthermore, 
according to 2016 data from Euromoney, an institutional investment company, the labor 
productivity growth for GCC countries are all in negative figures, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia with 0.33 percent of growth, which is also very minimal (“Labor Productivity Growth”, 
2017).  
Secondly, high economic regulations are another big challenge standing in the way of 
a prosperous private sector. Currently, there are too many regulations in GCC states and Dubai 
for private companies to grow. Interestingly, Mazaheri (2016) argues that oil producing 
countries tend to impose larger barriers to domestic firms and entrepreneurs in order to help 
the elites (i.e., the royal families) to have less competition and more profits for them. Also, 
many of these elite groups are already positioned in most of the important governmental 
institutions, which prevent new laws to be established or implemented (Ennis, 2015). Mazaheri 
(2016) also argues that start-up costs in GCC countries are 60 percent higher than those for 
non-oil producers. If we look at the case of Dubai, many of the companies are owned by only 
a few families. According to research from the Hawkamah Institute, the top five families in 
Dubai control between 10 percent to one third of board member seats for the 200 largest private 
companies in Dubai (Hertog, 2013). If we go up to the top 15 families, these 15 families control 
18 to 50 percent of the largest companies in Dubai (Hertog, 2013). This kind of monopoly is a 
serious problem regarding other small and medium private companies challenging these big 
families. On the other hand, Dubai also implemented a “competition law” in 2012 to remove 
monopoly in the market (Vinod, 2015; “UAE Competition Law”, 2016). According to the 
article, “This law is envisaged to free the national economy from all wrong practices that 
adversely affects its efficiency, including monopolies.” (Vinod, 2015). Although the law looks 
 28 
 
very well made and implemented on the surface, in reality, there are too many exemption 
sectors, which include, “telecommunications, financial services, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, 
electricity and water, transport, post services, cultural activities, and drainage and sanitation 
activities” (“UAE Competition Law”, 2016). Also, government owned entities are exempted, 
which I believe to be particularly problematic. Ennis (2015) even argues that these kinds of 
new laws or policies are merely in place in order to demonstrate that the governments of GCC 
countries are trying to promote entrepreneurship; however, in reality, this is not the case. Rather 
than ‘promotion’, these governments are merely ‘showing’ entrepreneurship to the people. In 
the GCC countries, most of the big companies are largely owned by the government. The seven 
largest companies in the GCC countries—SABIC, Etisalat, Al Rajhi bank, Industries Qatar, 
Zain, Qatar National Bank, and Saudi Telecom—all have a large proportion or majority of the 
government shares (Hertog, 2013). Actually, most of these companies used to be fully owned 
by the states. Therefore, it is almost impossible for private companies to challenge these state-
owned companies (SOEs), and this is also another big challenge for all the GCC countries.   
Moreover, new SMEs face large barriers and regulations to obtain any kind of lending or loan 
from the bank. According to Fisher (2012), banks in the GCC region are reluctant to lend the 
funds to SMEs due to a higher risk and failure to return the funds to the applicants. It is known 
that 55 percent of the SMEs in Gulf States do not have credit available for them, and even those 
who were able to borrow money have to return at a higher cost with high interests (Fisher, 
2012). Also, a study done by Dun and Bradstreet shows that the UAE banks rejected 50-70 
percent of credit applications from SMEs in 2008 (Hertog, 2010). However, it is easy for those 
big companies to borrow the money from the banks. 
Perhaps more importantly, banks have become much more reluctant to engage in  
‘name lending’, that is, the provision of loans purely on the basis of a merchant  
 29 
 
family’s name, without detailed checks of its accounts and business plans (Hertog,  
2013, pg, 31). 
Thus, the banks would only look at the names who are asking for funds and decides who gets 
the money. In addition, Mazaheri (2016) also mentions that high regulatory costs for SMEs 
make it difficult for them to solve problems such as obtaining permits, resolving contracts, 
paying taxes, and accessing credit facilities through the local banks, all of which prevent them 
from growing and prospering.  
Difficulties in getting a local block visa is a problem that many of the small entrepreneurs face 
every day (“The challenges”, 2014). Each company has to apply for a visa vacancy for each 
position for which they want to hire. However, it is very difficult to get certain types of 
professional visas, as well as visas for certain nationalities (“The challenges”, 2014). This may 
stem from a desire to limit the number of residents from certain countries due to security 
concerns. However, in many cases, this creates a considerable number of problems for small 
entrepreneurs, and due to this visa issues, many people often give up on the establishment 
process. In addition, all entrepreneurs in GCC countries have to have a licensed office to 
operate their company (“Dubai SME”, 2014). This increases fixed costs such as warehouse 
rent, retail store rents, and car rents, all of which are very expensive in these regions, and it can 
pose a serious obstacle for many small enterprises (“Dubai SME”, 2014). Dubai was ranked 
the 10th city in the world in terms of high costs of office spaces (Sola, 2016). Moreover, most 
of these small firms cannot be fully owned by foreigners, which means that 51 percent of the 
company’s share has to be owned by locals, which is known as the “Kafala system” (Mazaheri, 
2016). This is a very important statement and also another barrier for foreigners or foreign 
direct investments (FDI) to come and invest fully within the country. Although it is worth 
mentioning that there are places in operation without the Kafala system, such as certain area of 
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free zones in Dubai (Hertog, 2013).  
In conclusion, of the aforementioned challenges should be solved in order for SMEs 
to grow and prosper within Dubai. For example, the localization policy, which leads to low 
productivity, a monopoly within the country that is run by only a few families, and other 
economic regulations, which include difficulties accessing funds, high fixed costs, and 
difficulties obtaining a visa, etc. Therefore, now we will look at the case of South Korea to find 
a recommendation to improve the situation in Dubai and other GCC countries. 
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Chapter 4: South Korea 
According to the article entitled “Small and Medium enterprises in South Korea. In the 
shadow of big brothers”, Bakiewicz (2008) argues that,  
The Korean economic miracle has been created by the chaebols, a careful analysis of 
the evolution of small and medium companies in Korea demonstrates the important 
role of smaller businesses during the entire course of dynamic growth. The size  
structure of the Korean economy has been strictly controlled by the state and the 
development of SME have not occurred “by chance” (pg, 45).  
South Korea is one of the most frequently referred cases of economic miracles. It took less than 
half a century for Korea to catch up with the high income countries (Bakiewicz, 2008). During 
the last few decades, South Korea’s rate of growth was striking—more than eight percent yearly 
between 1962 and 1996, and five percent following the Asian crisis that lasted from 1997 until 
2008 (Bakiewicz, 2008). Interestingly, Amsden (1992) argues that South Korea had gone 
through rapid economic development after the Korean War in 1953, as with other late 
industrialized countries such as Taiwan or Singapore. South Korea’s economy was controlled 
by a bureaucratic, governmental state which manipulated the market system. The government 
pursued an export-oriented policy; however, the only benefit that Koreans had at the time was 
cheap labor (Amsden, 1992). Therefore, the Korean government pursued the export-oriented 
policy using these labors to create light industry, such as cottons and wigs, to heavy and 
chemical industries in the1970s and 1980s (Amsden, 1992).  
The first step to promoting the SMEs started early in the 1950s. At this moment, most 
of South Korea’s economy was dependent on aid from the USA, and the GDP per capita was 
just $67 (Bakiewicz, 2008; Mu-Hyun, 2015; Seogwon, 2013). As we can see from Figure 5, 
South Korea had grown from being the 2nd poorest country in the world in 1945 to become the 
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15th largest economy in the world in 2012 (Seogwon, 2013). 
 
Figure 5. Korea’s Economic Development (1953-2010) (Seogwon, 2013).  
Also, after the withdrawal of Japan (after the World War II), there were many Japanese 
companies in surplus, with many of them sold to renowned families in Korea and to prominent 
politicians (Jiyoon, 2015). These companies grew very fast with the support of the government 
forming a group called Chaebol. Chaebol could be translated as “Wealth Clan” which includes 
big companies such as Samsung and LG (Mu-Hyun, 2015). Jaejin (2005) argues that the 
Korean developmental state could be seen as a success due to the development and prosperity 
that Korea is enjoying now. Nowadays in South Korea, 99.9 percent of all enterprises are SMEs 
(Jihyun, 2016). SMEs account for between 50 % to 60% of the South Korean GDP with $ 780 
billion in 2013. Also, 87 percent of all employees in South Korea work in SMEs—an 
extraordinary high figure.   
SMEs in South Korea and Developmental State 
It is true that South Korean miracles were possible through big companies known as chaebol, 
but SMEs have also played a great role in order to achieve these tasks. In 1956, the South 
Korean government established the system to link the SMEs with Chaebol groups, thereby 
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establishing a system to financial help (Bakiewicz, 2008). 
Table 2. Small and Medium enterprises in manufacturing sector in Korea, 1952–2004. (Bakiewicz, 2008). 
 
As we can see from the Table 2, the role of SMEs had been of utmost importance since the start 
of the 1950s. The number of SMEs, in terms of the total enterprises, have totaled more than 97 
percent since the 1960s. Also, more than 60 percent of the populations have also been working 
in SMEs since the 1960s. Despite the fact that exports were much more reliant on large firms, 
the proportion of value-added production and value of productions were both similar to 50 to 
50 percent, which thus shows the importance of SMEs role in the growth. The strategy that was 
used by the government was “with the forefront position of large conglomerates, smaller 
companies have been playing roles according to a scenario assigned to them by the country’s 
economic strategies” (Bakiewicz, 2008, pg, 48). 
The government picked and supported certain sectors to grow rapidly, such as cement, plastics, 
and textiles, thereby allowing many of the SMEs to grow. This policy is known as import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), whereby the government intentionally reduces the amount 
of foreign imports of certain commodities and chooses certain sectors to grow by 
manufacturing them domestically. The most successful cases of ISI using trade as a tool is 
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South Korea. In 1961, a coup happened in Korea allowing Park Chung-hee to seize power, and 
by 1963, Chaebol formed the Federation of Korean Industries to support the role of Park’s drive 
(Mu-Hyun, 2015). Park who ruled South Korea from 1963 to 1979 until his death first aim was 
to elevate the economic status of Korea. In these periods, many SMEs grew from small 
companies to Chaebol, such as Hyundai and Daewoo.  
Park created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in 1961, which announces a new plan every 
five years (Graham, 2003). The head of the EPB was made deputy prime minister, which shows 
how much effort was placed on this institution. The EPB introduced the first five year plan in 
1962, which concentrated on building state-owned banks, as well as laws which forced private 
banks to follow the will of the government (Graham, 2003). During the first five years, the 
South Korean government used EPB as an “entrepreneur-manager”. Therefore,  
in the 1960s, more than one-third of government expenditures were for investment,  
and public investment accounted for close to a third of all fixed capital formation. Thus, 
between 1963 and 1977, public enterprises in Korea grew at an annual rate of 10 
percent, and the share of these enterprises in GDP grew from slightly over 6 percent in 
1963 to more than 9 percent in 1980 (Graham, 2003, pg, 16). 
It seems that Park really believed that the government is the dominant agent for the economy 
and he really showed it in reality.  
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Figure 6.Changes in Employment & Industrial Structure of Korea (1960&2010) (“New Economic School”, 2011). 
Figure 6, clearly shows that the employment structure has shifted mainly from agriculture and 
fishing in the 1960s to the service and manufacturing sectors in the 2010s. The GDP structure 
is also very similar, which is much more focused on the service and manufacturing sectors.  
Moreover, most of this economic growth was financed through foreign debt as well as 
the subsidized loans from state banks (Bakiewicz, 2008). Also, the government supported 
companies more through lowering taxes, importing licenses, and subsidizing credits. More 
interestingly, the government of South Korea imposed export quotas to these companies, which 
duly allowed the companies to become export-oriented minds no matter how much profits were 
made (Bakiewicz, 2008). Park’s regime used a “carrot and stick” approach to influence some 
of the textile companies to export, and as a carrot, a variety of subsidies and incentives were 
offered (Graham, 2003). Moreover, preferential loans, tax exemptions (including tariff 
exemption for imported goods), and other measures were given. According to Graham (2003),  
these subsidies were necessary to enable the Korean firms to compete against more- 
established Japanese exporters, which had non-cost incumbency advantages (e.g.,  
established relations with international wholesalers and distributors of textiles and  
textile products)” (pg, 20).  
This approach produced the results, and by 1961, textiles accounted for 25 percent of Korean 
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exports with $ 5.7 million. In 1965, total export rose to $106 million, which was 41 percent of 
the total export of South Korea (Graham, 2003). Korean exports multiplied by 28 times 
between 1961 to 1971. In 1966, the Small and Medium Industry Basic act was started, giving 
more support to the export-oriented companies (Bakiewicz, 2008). Thirteen sectors were 
chosen, which allowed 1315 SMEs to receive support during 1964 to 1972. Also, five industrial 
parks were established for SMEs (Bakiewicz, 2008).  
However, President Park’s dream was to produce steel products, such as ships, vehicles, 
and machinery, which could be associated as a national strength. He had this dream since the 
occupation of Japanese troops in Korea (Graham, 2003). However, to develop these industries, 
more funds were required and South Korea did not have these funds at this moment. Therefore, 
South Korea had to rely on foreign finances, and Park had to choose only a few sectors in order 
to invest. Also, interestingly, “foreign borrowing in Korea has been tightly monitored from the 
very beginning to make sure that borrowed capital is used productively” (SaKong, 1993, pg, 
106). Big international institutions supervised the usage of the funds. During the early 1970s, 
these funds were used for enterprises under government supervisions, to the heavy sectors, 
which were Park’s dream. The policy on heavy and chemical industry development (HIC) 
started in May 1973 to support the future industrialization. Heavy industry was strongly 
protected and supported by the government, which allowed these areas to succeed in 
international markets (Bakiewicz, 2008). A growth took off and Korea’s national savings grew 
from almost zero to 20 percent of GDP by 1970 (Graham, 2003). This number has risen to 25 
percent in 1980, and more than 35 percent in 1990, respectively. South Korea thereby 
transformed from a low-saving nation to one of the highest saving nations in the world (Graham, 
2003). However, most of the savings were controlled by the government. 
 In fact, as domestic savings grew in Korea, control over how to direct those savings  
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fell almost completely in the government’s hands, because in 1962, the Park  
government had brought the financial sector largely under government control  
(Graham, 2003, pg, 23). 
In the second half of the 1970s, South Korea focused more on labor- intensive exports and 
products of light industries as a major source of foreign revenues. Big companies supported 
with HIC policies to expand upon their heavy industry activities, whereas small companies 
focused on the subcontracts of big companies for easy-to-fabricate goods and elements. More 
complicated elements were imported (Bakiewicz, 2008). For SMEs, it was difficult for them 
to have modern technology due to the structure of protection, however, in reality, both big and 
small countries benefited through fulfilling each other’s needs (Bakiewicz, 2008). Also, in 
1979, the Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation was created to help SMEs to 
have better technology. Unlike Taiwan and Hong Kong, where SMEs had to compete with big 
companies for production orders, South Korea had developed a unique and emerging model of 
subcontracting. As Bakiewicz (2008) states, “Small companies became the element of a closely 
tighten vertical structure with a big exporter on the top and many subcontractors working for a 
single customer.” (pg, 54). This is a win-win strategy for both big and small companies. Under 
the HCI declaration, South Korea moved to new sectors such as industrial machinery, 
shipbuilding, the electrical industry, and the steel industry. Also, companies who were entering 
these sectors received preferential treatment, such as easy access to credits, tax breaks, and so 
on (Graham, 2003). This helped South Korea to become a world class competitor in selected 
sectors of heavy industries. Moreover, in the mid 1970s, many new SMEs were established 
through a former employee of larger companies (Bakiewicz, 2008). Very interestingly, large 
companies actually supported their former workers establishing a company, which thus 
provided them a capital, technology, and a place to order. “Subcontractors typically adjusted 
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their production profiles to the expectations of one customer” (Bakiewicz, 2008, pg, 54). Based 
on this structure, larger companies were able to have strict requirements on their subcontractors 
regarding quality, financial conditions, and time. Due to this kind of structural model, SMEs 
grew in importance during the mid-1970s, and it allowed SMEs to grow very rapidly during 
this period. Moreover, support for these SMEs has remained continuous as the Korean 
government realizes the importance of their role. The Hyundai company could be seen as a 
good model, which began small and later became chaebol, which was ranked the 49th most 
valuable brand in the world in 2015 (“The most valuable”, 2017). Also, they are the world’s 
largest shipbuilders. 
Hyundai 
Hyundai was a very small company before Park came into power in 1961. However, Park gave 
many favors to the Hyundai construction company, which thus allowed them to grow rapidly; 
such as providing a 400km road project in the form of a long expressway which connected the 
capital city Seoul with Southern cities (Mu-Hyun, 2015). Also, shipbuilding was one of the 
priority sectors that heavy and chemical industry development (HIC) focused on. At first, 
Hyundai was just a construction company; however, in 1970, Hyundai even built a shipyard in 
Ulsan without ever building a ship before (Mu-Hyun, 2015). It was not just a plan which came 
out of nowhere, it was a response to the government’s 1967 act to promote shipbuilding. 
Therefore, to enter to this sector was ultimately determined by the government, which required 
the Hyundai Company to garner the government’s support (Graham, 2003). At this moment, 
Korea already had some capability of building their own ship with their government-owned 
company; however, Hyundai got an opportunity to share this sector. Hyundai started Hyundai 
Heavy Industries (HHI) in 1973, in order to build ships, and within a decade, HHI became the 
largest shipbuilder in the world (Amsden, 1992). Construction of the first ship began in 1973 
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and took 2 years to finish the job, which was significantly behind schedule. The biggest 
challenge that Hyundai faced at that moment was not financial; rather, the human capital lacked 
the special skills and knowledge to build large-scale ships, which were never built (Graham, 
2003). Therefore, in 1973, Hyundai sent 70 workers from their company to A&P Appledore 
Shipyard in Scotland to learn how to manage and organize a large ship.  
 Hyundai engineers concurrently learned ship design from the Scottish firm  
Scotlithgrow, which sent personnel to the Ulsan facility to work on the two large  
crude carriers, which were identical in design to ships produced at its own yards 
(Graham, 2003, pg, 33).  
Also, the shipbuilding sector was depressed in Scotland; therefore, it was good timing for 
Hyundai to earn much-needed technology at a cheap price. Moreover, Amsden (1992) argues 
that no one knows exactly how much support the Hyundai Company received through the 
South Korean government, but it should be decisive. It is known that the Government of South 
Korea had a battle with Bretton Woods’s institutions to support and aid the building of 
shipyards from the first place. Also, “the government raised overseas credit for Hyundai Heavy 
Industries (HHI) both directly and indirectly, the latter guaranteeing HHI’s own foreign loans” 
(Amsden, 1992, pg, 276). Furthermore, the government provided HHI with continuous support 
for finance until they became one of the best in the world. Hyundai’s company motto thus 
became “shoot first, think later”, and by 1983, they became the top ship building company in 
Korea (Mu-Hyun, 2015). 
Education system 
South Korean students achieved the highest mean scores in math and science in the 
International Assessment of Education Progress (IAEP) administered by the Educational 
Testing Service (ETS) to 13 years old in 19 countries (Sorensen, 1994). South Korea is well 
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known for its great performance in the education system, even leading President Obama to 
officially praise the education system in Korea with regard to paying teachers as much as 
doctors (Fenton, 2015). However, it took a long time to build this kind of education system. 
After the World War II in 1945, the government made radical reforms to democratic higher 
education and abolished the remnants of the Japanese colonial education (Lee, 2001). However, 
the real reform came in the early 1960s in the period of President Park after the coup. Park saw 
the necessity to induce reform in the education system in order to industrialize the country and 
also to promote national identity. It is interesting to know that President Park knew that he 
needed to reform the country to achieve the industrialization. Also,  
In response to the strong need for educational reform, the government strengthened  
the legal and administrative systems of higher education under its uniform control. On 
the other hand, the government upgraded teacher education: normal high schools to 
teachers’ junior colleges in 1962, and institutions training secondary school teachers 
to four-year colleges of education in the same year (Lee, 2001, pg, 4). 
Teachers duly became very important figures, and here I want to highlight that all the teachers 
in Korea are Korean. This is very important, as most of the teachers in GCC states are not 
nationals, and they are not well treated by local citizens as well as students. For Koreans, the 
teacher is a highly respected figure.  
Moreover, 1960s reform included imparting loyalty, self-reliance, patriotism, and anti-
communism (Sorensen, 1994). In this process, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) again 
played a very important role. As the EPB announce a plan for economic development for every 
five years, in order to achieve this goal, the government promoted the expansion of higher 
education, which is an essential part in the system (Lee, 2001).  
Special attention to technical and scientific education also came in 1973, which also 
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lead to the establishment of vocational schools, which aimed to start a “movement to 
scientificize the whole people” (Sorensen, 1994). Between 1970 and 1980, junior colleges 
almost doubled in total, jumping from 65 to 127 schools. Junior college contributed to an 
increase of semi-skilled labor, which was very important at that time. However, we have to 
bear in mind that South Korea was still very poor during this period. Also, the number of higher 
education schools grew from 85 schools to 357 schools between 1960 and 1980 (Lee, 2001). 
Higher education was seen as driving force to the development of a national economy. Also, a 
very interesting point that is necessary to address is that South Korea does not spend a huge 
amount of funds on education. Only 4 percent of GDP is used in Education, which is relatively 
small compared to the 7.5 percent spent by the United States. Many people believe that a strong 
family structure and placing a large value on education are most important ingredients of 
educational success in East Asian countries (Sorensen, 1994). Therefore, even though there is 
a large amount of spending in GCC countries towards education, the whole system needs to be 
reconsidered in order to change the foundation of education systems.   
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Chapter 5: Recommendations and Limitations 
As seen previously, most of the GCC countries have a diversification plan in moving 
away from a resource-based economy to more of knowledge-based economy. However, in 
reality, GCC countries tend to rely on simple technologies, and their contribution to knowledge 
based economy is very limited (Hertog, 2013). Therefore, the first recommendation proposed 
here is a structural transition, which is also seen in the case of South Korean development 
model; that is, moving towards a modern and manufacturing society. The current system in 
GCC countries is very much focused on non-oil tradable production. This means that rather 
than producing these items, companies would simply bring certain items which are more 
attractive than to sell it to the market without any addition of values. This is more convenient, 
less risky, and is more profitable for the firms. (Miniaoui & Schilirò, 2017). Also, this system 
is possible due to the low-waged foreign workers, which reduces the large amount of fixed 
costs to the firms; however, it does not really contribute to economic growth of the country, but 
rather it hinders the path to achieving a knowledge-based economy and the growth of the 
manufacturing sectors (Miniaoui, & Schilirò, 2017). 
Also, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), which was used in South Korea, 
could be implemented in the case of Dubai. This means that rather than importing goods from 
abroad, the government could choose certain sectors to focus and grow that sector over the 
long term. As mentioned earlier, the South Korean government used Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) as an entrepreneurial manager, where they controlled one third of government 
expenditure and invested in the sectors which could be grown rapidly. Therefore, public 
enterprises grew 10 percent annually during 1963 and 1977 (Graham, 2003). Hence, the role 
of government intervention should grow enormously, rather than using localization policies 
which are unproductive, less sustainable, and bad for the citizens in long run. Lastly, export-
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oriented industrialization, innovation, and education is another core element that should be 
comprehensively backed by the government institutions, such as the EPB in South Korea.  
Modern, manufacturing society & Import-Substitution Industry (ISI)  
Even though GCC countries want to move rapidly towards advanced technological 
societies, these countries still largely rely on simple technologies (Hertog, 2013). This theme 
should shift to follow the case of East Asian industrializers like South Korea. As stated by 
Hertog, 
state support in the GCC has by and large not been conditional on technology upgrades, 
and the GCC has witnessed none of the resource scarcity that has forced advanced 
Asian manufacturers to invest into technology… Research and development (R&D) in 
the region is still inchoate… Very few international patents emerge from the GCC 
(Hertog, 2013, pg, 26-27).  
The Research and development (R &D) sector is very weak in GCC countries, and expenditure 
in R&D was really low in this region. In 2011, the UAE spent less than 0.1 percent of their 
GDP on R&D expenditure, followed by Saudi Arabia with 0.08 percent and Kuwait 0.11 
percent, respectively. Up to this date, most high-technology sectors and technological 
development were limited to state-owned companies (SOEs) (Hertog, 2010). It could be seen 
by Figure 7 that GCC countries are not really exporting any of their high-tech exports. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of high-tech exports in total manufacturing exports in the GCC countries (Hertog, 2013)  
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The UAE has 3.2 percent of high-technology exports, but this is much less compared to the 
East Asian countries and OECD countries, which have 28.4 and 17.4 percent respectively 
(Hertog, 2013). As shown in Figure 7, data was originally produced by the World Bank, and 
high-technology includes high R&D products such as “aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, 
scientific instruments, and electrical machinery” (Hertog, 2013, pg, 27). Therefore, if Dubai 
and other GCC countries want to advance into a knowledge-based economy, R&D expenditure 
should be increased enormously.  
On the other hand, just to give a sample model, if we look at the case of South Korea, 
the total opposite is noted. South Korea’s R&D expenditure is 4.29 percent of their GDP, which 
made them the highest spenders in 2014 (Zastrow, 2016). This 4.29 percent amounted to $60.5 
billion, which is almost the same as 65 percent of Dubai’s total GDP in 2014, which was $ 92.6 
billion (“Dubai economy growth”, 2015). Here, this research does not argue that Dubai should 
spend 65 percent of their GDP on R&D expenditure; however, the investment should increase 
gradually if Dubai really intends to shift to a knowledge-based economy. Also, the government 
should take a much stronger role in their investment policy to encourage private businesses to 
follow their paths.   
 
Figure 8. Rising Share of R&D Investment in Korea’s GDP (2000-2013) (Ro, 2014) 
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As we can see from Figure 8, South Korea’s R&D investment was just over 2.5 percent in the 
year 2000. However, throughout 17 years it increased gradually, which made South Korea one 
of the highest investors for research and development. South Korea is also a world leader of 
patent applications (Ro, 2014). Also, we saw the case of Dubai in figure 1, where 57 percent 
of their business sector is focused on trading, and where more importantly, the manufacturing 
sector was only 8 percent, whereas South Korea’s is 30.8 percent (“New Economic School”, 
2011). In 1960, this figure was only 17 percent in South Korea, hence, it has gradually increased 
throughout the time. However, as the South Korean government used the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) to focus on certain sectors, especially in textiles and heavy industries with the 
availability of cheap labor during that period, Dubai should also find and focus on their own 
possible sectors with the potential of development. In June 2016, the Vice-president of UAE, 
and ruler of Dubai, Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched the Dubai Industrial 
Strategy, which aims to build a global platform of a knowledge-based economy and innovation-
focused businesses (Bin Rashid, 2016).  
With the launch of the Dubai Industrial Strategy… We are one step closer to achieving 
the goal of making Dubai a homeland for innovators, a favorite place to live and work 
in, a global economic hub and a preferred destination for visitors… sound economy 
today means a diverse and integrated economy led by the industry and manufacturing 
sectors and built on pillars of innovation and creativity (Bin Rashid, 2016) 
The five key objectives of this strategy are to increase the output and value-added products in 
the manufacturing sector, enhance the depths of knowledge and innovations, build a platform 
of manufacturing in Dubai, elevate the energy-efficient manufacturing sector, and make Dubai 
the center of the global Islamic market (Bin Rashid, 2016). Also, it focuses on six priority sub-
sectors, which include aerospace, aluminum and fabricated metals, food and beverages, 
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machinery and equipment, medical equipment, and maritime. These sub sectors are chosen due 
to the importance of meeting the Dubai Industrial Strategy and Dubai plan 2021 (“Mohammad 
Bin Rashid”, 2016). I believe that Dubai is focusing on the right path, as, for example, their 
aerospace is a good choice due to the huge size of Emirates airlines, which has 239 aircrafts 
and 269 more that are already on order (Bin Rashid, 2016). 
However, ISI is being implemented in Dubai, and it is not a new strategy in the country. 
Also, the UAE previously used the ISI strategy in the 1970s to develop small industries such 
as food processing, beverages, and also some parts of heavyweight industries (Yousef, 2011). 
However, this strategy has not been used continuously. Nowadays, there are many scholars 
who emphasize the importance of the ISI strategy for GCC countries to reduce the imports and 
focus on certain manufacturing sectors to achieve diversification. Hvidt (2013) argues that,  
 Diversification through the establishment of import substitution industries is  
potentially much closer to the original aim of divesting away from oil. It also holds a  
much better prospect of survival after the oil era, if this industry was accustomed to 
operate under market conditions during the oil era. (pg, 7).  
Therefore, the government of Dubai should really try to implement the Dubai Industrial 
Strategy not only for the State owned companies (SOEs) but to the private companies as well. 
However, as mentioned earlier, I believe localization is an obstacle to achieving this goal. As 
we saw from the development state model, the most important part in the state-led system is 
the relationship between state and privately-owned businesses, which relate to competent 
bureaucracy (Johnson, 1982). Competent bureaucracy is the government having a planned 
process in economic development, such as making an institution like EPB in South Korea. 
These institutions require the best human capitals, which can direct the way of the country’s 
development and are usually small. Also, these agencies enjoy high prestige and legitimacy, 
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which allow them to continuously recruit outstanding people for their group and to utilize 
policy tools to give them extra authority (Kasahara, 2013). However, in the case of Dubai and 
GCC countries that have a localization policy, the productivity is low, and many of these 
institutions may employ someone who is not capable of working in these agencies. Such an 
employee could be from either a royal or a renowned family, who should not belong to these 
agencies, and might be placed there by government workers or from other connections. 
Moreover, due to the localization policy, most citizens prefer working in public sectors rather 
than private sectors, which makes privately-owned businesses less competitive compared to 
public ones. Therefore, due to the importance of a competent bureaucracy, the government of 
Dubai should really have the mind to make these institutions as transparent as possible, and 
furthermore, that they are not controlled by certain families or clans. Also, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, only a few families control a large portion of the enterprises in Dubai (Hertog, 2013). 
Therefore, it is likely for these families to gain greater control of the six priority-chosen sub-
sectors, which does not lead the private sectors to becoming more competitive. Also, another 
important part of the government’s role in the development of a state model is to supervise the 
competition of companies, which assures economic health as well as effectiveness (Johnson, 
1982). Moreover, this will be more carefully looked at in a free trade and export oriented 
economy 
Export-Oriented Economy & Innovation and Education 
The last recommendation is to have an export-oriented economy, innovation, and 
education. As we saw in the case of the South Korean development model, the government 
uses an ISI strategy after choosing certain sectors that could be grown rapidly. Also, the 
government supported private companies by lowering regulations, such as subsidizing credits 
and lowering taxes. The government also tried to give more benefits to export-oriented 
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companies by employing a carrot and stick approach, as mentioned in Chapter 3. However, to 
move to an export-oriented economy, we first need citizens to work in the actual private fields. 
If the country wants to achieve sustainable development, human capital is very important, and 
this means we need the skills and knowledge to be transferred to the local citizens; as a result, 
the citizens’ performance will improve. Furthermore, we cannot continuously rely on low-
waged foreign workers or high-waged technicians because when the time comes, these foreign 
workers would return to their countries. Also, this means we need more local citizens to be 
educated and prepared to get knowledge-transfer as well as working in private sectors. 
However, as mentioned, the large number of available public sector jobs discourages local 
nationals from pursuing entrepreneurship and private sector employment. The average wage of 
the public sector is much higher than that of the private sector, which makes public sector jobs 
much more attractive to nationals (Callen et al., 2014). Ironically, even though the country 
wants to diversify the economy and have a flourishing private sector, there are not enough 
people willing to work in the private sector, especially in SMEs. 
Due to these reasons, each of the GCC countries announced a long-term strategy, for 
example, the UAE’s Vision 2021, Qatar’s National vision for Qatar 2022, Bahrain’s Vision 
2030, Oman’s Vision 2020, and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 (Miniaoui & Schilirò, 2017). Each 
country has slightly different goals for each category; however, they are expecting that these 
strategies will allow the country to achieve economic diversification and at the same time 
promote the importance of the private sectors. However, this goal is very difficult as most of 
the economies are still deeply dependent on hydrocarbon sectors, and most citizens still prefer 
government jobs rather than private ones. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, the education 
system needs to be changed. 
Also, as explained in Chapter 4, South Korea installed an Economic Planning Board 
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(EPB), which even played a role in expanding higher education. This kind of institution 
required extensively in Dubai, rather than localization policies. Not to forget the importance of 
the teachers who deals directly with our children who is the future of the nations. Moreover, 
nationals need to treat the local school teachers with more of respect and encourage more local 
citizens to become one of respected teachers. This is very important that Dubai nationals teach 
Dubai students. In addition, technical and scientific education appeared in the 1970s in South 
Korea, with the aim of scientificizing the whole population, and a similar strategy was 
implemented in the UAE in 2015; however, I believe this kind of program should have come 
earlier.  
Also, innovation is a very important factor for economic diversification and it boosts 
the growth of the economy. It also contributes to the increase of human capital, which in turn 
leads to high-productivity (Ennis, 2015). Therefore, if we are going to have more equipped 
citizens to work in private sectors, the government needs to invest more into these sectors. 
Global Innovation Index (GII) is another important indicator that is used to observe the impact 
of the innovation policies of certain countries. Innovation Input Sub-index includes five main 
pillars to understand the national economy, thus allowing innovative actions, institutions, 
human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication, and business sophistication 
(Miniaoui & Schilirò, 2017). According to the index, Switzerland was ranked number one, 
followed by the United Kingdom, with Sweden in first place. The UAE was ranked in 47th 
place. All of the other GCC countries were below this position, except Saudi Arabia (43rd). 
Ennis (2015) quotes one of definition of innovation from the World Bank; 
Innovation is technology or practices that are new to given society. Innovation is not  
only derived from high technology, but also developments in low-technology and 
the utilization of indigenous knowledge.” (pg, 117). 
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Therefore, innovation should be more promoted because it will lead to the economic growth, 
welfare, and competitiveness. Country like Dubai, it is very important to focus on innovation 
to become like knowledge-based economy of South Korea.  
Limitation of Study  
This study faced a number of limitations and difficulties throughout, especially when 
comparing the resource-based economy of UAE’s small state Dubai with the knowledge-based 
economy of South Korea. Also, the biggest challenge was the population composition, which 
is very different. In the past, South Korea’s workforces were mostly national, whereas Dubai’s 
workforces are dominantly foreign workers. Which means that, in the case of South Korea, 
most of the revenues remain within the country, whereas in the case of Dubai, many of the 
foreign workers tend to send their money back to their own countries or to their families abroad. 
Naufal and Termos (2010) argue that this remittance figure is enormous and that the second-
highest remittance country in the world was Saudi Arabia with $ 16 billion in 2006. Also, many 
of the GCC countries ranked high on sending remittances. Therefore, to implement the South 
Korean developmental state model in Dubai could be somewhat controversial. However, as 
both countries’ economic structures are still highly dependent on trade and services, it would 
have been interesting to compare both countries.  
Also, as mentioned in the recommendation for the importance of import-substitution industries 
(ISI) in Dubai, it is very difficult to support the private import substitution sector because it 
only comes through entrepreneurship and private companies taking risks. Hvidt (2013) also 
highlights the same arguments. Moreover, even though governments pursue these policies, it 
is not easy for private sectors to import all the raw materials, and provide the human capital to 
manufacture the goods that would, in turn, increase the price enormously for private businesses. 
Therefore, as is being done in the case of Dubai with the “Dubai Industrial Strategy”, the ISI 
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policy should first be implemented in the State-owned companies’ then implement to the 
private businesses.  
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
 After the sudden drop in oil prices in 2014, the GCC countries duly realized the 
importance of diversifying their economy, and thus, the role of private sectors became 
increasingly important. Therefore, there is a tremendous pressure placed upon these countries 
to diversify their economies in order to reduce their dependency on oil. Dubai was one of the 
first states in the Gulf countries to realize and focus on the importance of SMEs. Currently, 95 
percent of firms in Dubai are SMEs, and 42 percent of the total workforces are working in this 
sector. As a result, there were increased job opportunities for locals, as well as jobs for foreign 
workers. Also, this helped Dubai to reduce their dependency on oil from 45 percent in the 
1980s to 5 percent in 2010.  
However, sector-wise, Dubai’s SME is highly dependent on simple trading activities, 
and the manufacturing sector is relatively low. Also, SMEs’ contribution to GDP is lower than 
other developed Asian countries such as China, Singapore, and South Korea. The Dubai 
government encourages local citizens to work in SMEs as well as in private sectors; however, 
in reality, the citizens working in these private sectors are very limited. Also, there are other 
challenges, such as localization and economic regulations, which prevent SMEs from growing. 
The llocalization policy is very important for the governments of the UAE, and it is one of the 
main goals for the UAE’s National Vision 2021. However, when we look at the current situation 
in the UAE, it seems that the youth unemployment and poor participation towards the private 
sectors still remain as challenges. At the same time, localization also leads citizens toward low 
productivity. Dubai’s productivity per person is relatively lower than other trading-oriented 
countries, such as Singapore and South Korea. Also, high economic regulations and the 
monopoly of certain sectors by specific families is an obstacle to the growth of SMEs in Dubai.  
Since the 1960s, the South Korean government has used the developmental state theory 
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to develop the country. South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world following 
WWII in 1945. At this time, the government largely relied on aid from the United States. 
However, the Korean government supported a large number of small enterprises, with many 
SMEs becoming chaebol over time. Also, after the coup in 1961, President Park used the 
developmental state theory to support a large portion of chaebol, as well as SMEs. Therefore, 
three stages of the developmental state model could be implemented in regard to the case of 
Dubai. First, commodity exports, which focus on the economy with large manufacturing 
sectors. Second, import-substitution industrialization (ISI), which reduces the amount of the 
import and instead manufactures certain goods with the support of the government, which has 
the potential to grow. Lastly, the export-oriented economy, innovation, and education, all of 
which are controlled by state institutions to encourage private companies to focus on exports. 
Also, some parts of the education system need to be reformed in order to foster entrepreneurial 
minds among the populations. Teachers should be treated more respectively and Dubai should 
focus on training the citizens to become a teacher which be beneficial for their own children. 
Moreover, innovation programs should be more promoted as it increases economic growth as 
well as competiveness and welfare of the country. If Dubai can achieve all of these goals, then 
I believe Dubai can take further steps towards becoming a developed country.  
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